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Abstract
This paper presents the results of a series of experiments in a simulated double-auction stock
market. Price formation was observed under various manipulations of asymmetric information
and communication, including conditions intended to promote imitative behaviour and
rumour. Inefficient prices were observed when the presence of insiders was completely
disguised – that is, prices reflected the expectations of non-insiders. When the presence (but
not the identity) of insiders was revealed there was a sharp increase in imitative behaviour that
appeared to be one-sided – observed prices became efficient with respect to bad news but not
with respect to good news. When subjects were allowed to communicate uncertain
information to create a climate of rumour (they could lie, tell the truth and/or spread rumours
but were forbidden to prove the veracity of any communication) there was a decrease in both
efficiency and price volatility – that is, informational noise appeared to mask the signals of
insiders. Price formation under these conditions was similar to the homogeneous xpectatio s
baseline, but there was also some evidence of speculative pricing.
1Insider Trading, Imitative Behaviour and Price Formation
in a
Simulated Double-Auction Stock Market
1. Introduction
The effects of asymmetric information, rumours and what Black (1986) has referred to as
‘noise trading’ have provoked an increasing degree of academic interest over the past few
years, but the behavioural mechanisms of information dissemination and price discovery are
still poorly understood. The existence of asymmetric information in asset markets allows the
possibility of adverse selection (the exploitation of private information when trading with
uninformed agents, for example by offering for sale only inferior quality assets). This in turn
motivates not only the search for information by market traders but also the communication of
misleading information and other strategic behaviour. For the uninformed, a situation of
general uncertainty may also lead to imitation (and ultimately to ‘herd’ behaviour): as
Grossman (1976) has observed, when confidence in fundamentals disappears, naive imitative
behaviour may actually be the best option. While there has been a considerable literature on
the effect of the structural characteristics of markets on informational efficiency there appears
to have been very little systematic research either into the effects of misleading information
and rumour or into the conditions under which imitative behaviour is likely to occur. The
experimental approach is ideally suited to investigations of this kind since it is possible to
control both the structure of the market and the signals through which information is
disseminated.
This paper presents the results of a series of experiments in a simulated double-auction
stock market. Price formation was observed under various manipulations of asymmetric
information and communication, including conditions intended to promote imitative
behaviour and rumour. Inefficient prices were observed when the presence of insiders was
completely disguised – that is, prices reflected the expectations of non-insiders. When the
presence (but not the identity) of insiders was revealed there was a sharp increase in imitative
behaviour that appeared to be one-sided – observed prices became efficient with respect to
bad news but not with respect to good news. When subjects were allowed to communicate
uncertain information to create a climate of rumour (they could lie, tell the truth and/or spread
rumours but were forbidden to prove the veracity of any communication) there was a decrease
in both efficiency and price volatility – that is, informational noise appeared to mask the
signals of insiders. Price formation under these conditions was similar to the homogeneous
2expectations baseline, but there was also evidence of imitative behaviour and a small amount
of speculative price formation.
There is a fairly large theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of asymmetric
information on market efficiency. Much of the debate focuses on the institutional conditions
under which the behaviour of insiders will transmit revealing signals that lead to efficient
price discovery, but less seems to have been written about the strategic behaviour of market
participants and behavioural mechanisms of price formation.
When information is asymmetric but perfect, experimental evidence suggests that
market prices are fully efficient (Plott and Sunder, 1982; Sunder, 1992). When information is
imperfect, it appears that dissemination in experimental markets is partial. Leland (1992), has
suggested that insider trading leads to greater informational efficiency, lower market liquidity,
more volatile prices and ambiguous overall welfare effects. Copeland and Friedman (1991)
examine price formation in experimental asset markets, finding evidence of partial revelation
of private information that supports a semi-strong form of market efficiency. Ackertet al.
(1997) present evidence for Bayesian pricing with partial (and somewhat slow) dissemination
of information in experimental, oral, double-auction markets. The degree of non-Bayesian
pricing (generally occurring as price under-reaction) seemed to increase with the uncertainty
of private information. Ackert and Church (1998) find that information dissemination and
insider profits in experimental markets are affected by the traders’ previous experience, and
suggest that efficiency i reases with both the number of insiders and the experience of
traders. The substantive effect of insider trading on market prices in the real world has been
the subject of some debate. The case histories of illegal insider trading presented by Cornell
and Sirri (1992), Meulbroek (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) (involving
relatively large trading volumes) appear to provide strong evidence that insider trading is
significantly correlated with stock-price run-ups. However, these studies have recently been
subjected to methodological criticism by Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) who argue that
these studies did not compare the effects of insider trading to the effects of normal (non-
insider) trading and that no such conclusion can be sustained when the appropriate
comparisons are made.
These studies raise the question as to whether relatively large volumes of insider
trading are necessary in order to communicate information through price signals. There is a
conceptual distinction between small (but revealing) price signals that are subsequently
exaggerated by large volumes of imitative uninformed trading (fads and herd behaviour) and
large price changes that are directly initiated by large volumes of insider trades.
3Holding constant the institutional characteristics of markets (such as market
transparency) and the diligence of search behaviour, we might expect the quality of a signal
generated by inside trading to be influenced by the market power of insiders. This empirical
question seems to have received little attention1.
Similarly, holding constant the number of insiders and their market power, we may
expect the quality of a price signal to be influenced by the institutional features of the market.
This has been the subject of a considerable amount of research, largely stimulated by the
theoretical models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In particular, researchers
have asked whether market liquidity, transaction costs, informational efficiency, price
discovery and the welfare of market participants are influenced by the structural
characteristics of trading arrangements (particularly with respect to disclosure of information
and market transparency). Madhavan (1992) distinguishes between quote-driven and order-
driven markets, arguing for more efficient price discovery in the quote-driven system. Pagano
and Roell (1996) use a theoretical model in which the effect of insider trading on market
liquidity is examined in markets that are classified by degree of transparency (the extent to
which market makers are able to observe the size and direction of the current order flow).
They conclude that market makers are able to reduce the bid-ask spread (increase market
liquidity) in more transparent markets (such as the call auction of Kyle, 1985), with
consequent benefits to uninformed traders. Schnitzlein (1996), also based on Kyle (1985),
presents results from experimental market trading comparing call auctions (buy and sell
orders collected over an interval, batched, then executed at a single price) and continuous
auctions (buy and sell orders executed on arrival). Schnitzlein finds not only that call auctions
are no less efficient than continuous auctions but that they are more liquid and lead to lower
adverse selection costs for uninformed traders. Lamou eux and Schnitzlein (1997) present
experimental results suggesting that market makers price more aggressively when bilateral
trades between liquidity traders are allowed, with a consequent decrease in dealer profits.
Garfinkel and Nimalendram (1998) conclude that the NYSE is less anonymous than
NASDAQ, encouraging price discovery, reducing the problem of adverse selection and
reducing transaction costs. Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) manipulate information disclosure
                                                 
1 Franciosi et al. (1996) and Guth et al., (1997) have reported experiments on the so-called
‘endowment effect’ that predicts undertrading (willingness to accept greater than willingness
to pay). They have found, interalia, that the portfolio choices of individuals are affected by
the composition of their initial endowed portfolios. However, we have been unable to find any
papers that directly test whether markets with rich insiders display greater price efficiency
than markets with poor insiders.
4in experimental markets and find that disclosure increases efficiency (more rapid convergence
to true value) but may increase bid-ask spreads at market opening and allow market makers to
benefit at the expense of both uninformed traders and liquidity traders. The results of
Bloomfield and O’Hara are apparently contradicted by those of Flood et al. (1999), whose
experimental design is based on the theoretical model of G osten and Milgrom (1985). Flood
et al. find that pre-trade spreads are wider, and initial volume lower, in opaque experimental
markets, but that price discovery is accelerated in opaque markets by aggressive pricing by
market makers seeking information once trading begins.
The general consensus of this research seems to be that greater disclosure of
information improves price discovery but that secondary effects on welfare, transaction costs
and liquidity depend quite sharply on specific trading arrangements in the particular markets.
As Glosten (1999) has observed, the apparent contradictions between Bloomfield a d O’Hara
(1999) and Flood et al., (1999) can be at least partly explained by differences in experimental
treatments and controls2, providing insights into the sensitivity of price formation to specific
experimental trading arrangements3.
The behavioural mechanisms of communication and price formation seem to be less
well documented. Of particular interest are (i) r t gic behaviour by traders trying to exploit
privileged information and/or to create opportunities through rumour or bluff, and (ii)
imitative behaviour by uninformed traders.
Communication mechanisms have been the focus of a small literature4 on
experimental games, but only a very few papers seem to have been written about strategic
insider behaviour (such as providing misleading information in an attempt to enhance gains
from adverse selection). Glosten (1989) describes a model in which a specialist with a
monopoly of information is able to price-discriminate between trades in order to make
strategic profits. Neuberger and Hansch (1996), in a study of dealer behaviour on the London
Stock Exchange, conclude that dealers seek to avoid quoting prices that reveal information
                                                 
2 For example, Flood et al. employed experienced professional traders who used very positive
strategies for discovering information in opaque markets.
3 The sensitivity of results to experimental manipulation (sometimes unintended) has been
long established in experimental psychology. Researchers in experimental economics have
begun to be similarly aware: for example, Tuttle t al. (1997) show that efficiency in
experimental double-auction markets is influenced by the order in which information items
are presented.
4 This is a literature in which information is either held in common or must be disclosed in
order for trade to occur. Thus there is no scope for adverse selection. (For a brief review of
this literature see Forsythe t al., 1999).
5and instead trade on their own account, accepting losses on some trades in order to make
abnormal profits on others. In the only experimental paper we have been able to find,
Forsythe t al. (1999) report results from a very tightl -controlled experiment incorporating
two conditions on communication. To investigate adverse selection, insider sellers were either
allowed to make unrestricted claims about the value of the asset to be traded (‘cheap talk’) or
were required to give a range of estimated values which contained the true value (‘anti-
fraud’). Experimental parameters were manipulated so as to ensure the existence of gains
from trade. The predicted Nash equilibrium involving credible communication of sellers’
information and full market efficiency was not achieved, although both types of
communication led to an increase in efficiency compared to a ‘no-communication’ control (in
which adverse selection was evident). There was a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers
under the ‘cheap talk’ condition – buyers evidently believed exaggerated claims under the
‘cheap talk’ condition because they tended to pay too much for the asset5. The paper by Flood
et al. (1999) is an excellent example of tight control and precise hypoth si -testing, but this is
achieved by surrendering the richness of a continuous and dynamic market environment. In
the experiments reported below we have investigated, inter alia, the responses of subjects
who were allowed freedom to use strategic behaviour in continuous trading with relatively
few controls on communication.
The literature on imitative behaviour examines how individual actions aggregate into
‘herd’ behaviour that is not obviously consistent with underlying economic fundamentals6 –
for example, models of fads (Shiller, 1984), speculative dynamics (Cutleret al., 1990, 1991)
and informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 1998). Other interesting theoretical
developments have focused specifically on the contagious nature of imitative behaviour.
Thus, Topol (1991) describes stock market traders with incomplete information who assume
that different prices posted by other traders represent information different from their own.
These traders therefore condition their bid/ask offers on the average of the bid/ask offers of
traders with whom they are in direct contact, as well as on their own (incomplete) information
about fundamental values, with contagion-led speculative bubbles emerging in more-or-less
mechanical consequence. The model of Banerjee (1993) is similar to that of Topol but
incorporates optimisation behaviour by individual investors. For Banerjee, each investor uses
                                                 
5 This result is not readily explained – multi-period strategies were irrelevant and all subjects
had experience as both buyer and seller and were prevented from engaging in side-deals.
6 See Spotton and Rowley (1998) for a review of both orthodox and unorthodox approaches to
the treatment of market volatility.
6an optimal Bayesian rule to decide whether to invest in a project with uncertain profitability,
and only learns of the existence of the project from another agent who has already accepted
the opportunity to invest. This means that the probability of receiving the uncertain
information increases with the number of other people who have invested – a ‘rumour’
process. The model of herd behaviour used by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) is in some ways
similar but uses a very different set of behavioural assumptions. These authors assume that
managers seek to increase their worth on the labour market by deliberately mimicking the
investment behaviour of other managers. If successful, they are perceived as ‘smart’ but if
unsuccessful they are able to share the ‘blame’ with a large number of others. Such imitative
behaviour leads to socially inefficient outcomes that are nonetheless individually rational. In
empirical work that gives some support to the notion of contagion, Camerer a d Weigelt
(1991) report that experimental market traders occasionally over-react to uninformative trades
during the early part of trading sessions, creating information mirages and mini-bubbles when
no insiders are present. The general conclusion of the theoretical literature on communication
and imitative behaviour is that speculative bubbles and crashes may be provoked by the
contagious spread of uncertain (and possibly highly inaccurate) information between
uninformed traders. However, very little empirical evidence has been so far presented to
support this conclusion.
Our experiment adds to the literature reviewed above by reporting results from
continuous double-auction markets characterised by asymmetric information and several
different conditions on communication. We examine price formation when: i) the presence of
insiders is either known or unknown; ii) insiders have varying degrees of market power; and
iii) free communication is allowed (intended to stimulate rumour and imitative behaviour).
2. Experimental Design
The general design of the experiment is presented in Table 1. In an attempt to retain
experimental control while simultaneously allowing a reasonable degree of contextual
richness and realism we used regime changes to achieve successive experimental
manipulations with a single group of subjects (traders). Each session differed with respect to a
single aspect of information dissemination. Sessions were long enough (about 30 to 70
minutes) to allow dynamic price formation processes (such as feedback trading, strategic
trading by insiders, portfolio re-composition) while possible learning effects were mitigated
by providing training prior to the baseline session.
7Table 1. Experimental Design
Duration
(seconds)
Insiders
exist
Specification Role of
session
Session
1
2750 No · Identical endowments
· Homogeneous expectations (identical information)
· Communication between traders not permitted
Baseline
Session
2
1783 Yes · Inside traders exist, unknown to uninformed traders
· Identical endowments
· Communication between traders not permitted
Test
Session
3
1792 Yes · All traders know that unidentified insiders exist
· Identical endowments
· Communication between traders not permitted
Test
Session
4
1950 Yes · All traders know that unidentified insiders exist
· Insiders given larger endowments than non-insiders
· Communication between traders not permitted
Test
Session
5
4200 Yes · All traders know that unidentified insiders exist
· Identical endowments
· Communication between traders encouraged
Test
8An undesirable feature of this approach was the surrender of control over the manipulation of
‘rumour’. We aimed at creating a climate in which rumour would flourish by allowing
subjects to communicate with almost total freedom – they were forbidden only to prove the
veracity of their communications (that is, they were not allowed to show messages they had
received from the experimenters). This meant that we could not guarantee the emergence of
rumour, or dictate its type, but neither were we constrained by a sterile, static environment7.
Hypotheses
Session 1 provided a homogeneous expectations baseline against which to measure the effect
of the secret introduction of asymmetric information in session 2. In session 3, announcing the
existence of anonymous insiders was intended to produce a step-wise increase in the
transparency of the market8. Session 3 also provided a natural baseline against which to
measure the effects of the endowment manipulation of session 4 and the rumour manipulation
of session 5. The following hypotheses are represented by these manipulations:
1. Price formation is efficient in a simulated asset market with homogeneous information.
2. Price formation is strong-form inefficient when the existence of asymmetric information is
disguised and traders are naïve.
3. The simple announcement that insiders exist leads to an increase in market efficiency
(because of an effective increase in market transparency).
4. Market efficiency increases when insiders have market power (because of an effective
increase in market transparency).
5. The incidence of speculative bubbles and crashes increases in a climate of rumour (An
effective decrease in market transparency when the presence of insiders is suspected).
Procedures
The experiments were conducted in a simulated electronic stock market, using computer
software obtained from the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona,
requiring a DOS-based local network. The market was a double-auction order-driven stock
market that was not subject to any fiscal, financial or institutional regulation. Trading was
continuous and all orders and trades were recorded centrally. The market was simplified in the
sense that i) only one stock was traded, ii) traders were not allowed to borrow or lend their
                                                 
7 This is a trade-off inherent in all experimental work and there is a place for both extremes.
8 The manipulation also helped to prevent unwanted learning effects since it meant that all
traders were simultaneously alerted to the informational content of price signals.
9endowed capital, iii) information was presented simultaneously to all traders (although
different traders could receive different information) and iv) there were no formal transaction
costs. Informal transaction costs were present in the sense that it required vigilance and effort
on the part of traders to follow and interpret the information available through the order book.
Illustrations of the trading screen and the Order Book are given in Appendix 1, together with
the summary instruction sheet.
Traders (the experimental subjects) were given an initial endowment of shares and
cash (‘experimental’ dollars) and could trade until either bankruptcy or the end of the session.
To ensure subject motivation and continued participation throughout the entire series of
experiments the endowment was re-set to the original amount at the beginning of each
session. In fact, no bankruptcies were observed.
The exact duration of each session was not known to the subjects in advance, because
it was necessary to encourage active trading at all times and to avoid flurries of last-minute
trading. As the results indicate, this goal was achieved. The basic features of each session
were standardised (the same laboratory, the same traders, the same experimental procedures)
to give a constant and controlled experimental environment.
In each session an initial price of $4 was established by reference to preceding
hypothetical trading periods. Information conveying good or bad news was presented at
random times during trading. This information was revealed by a system of coded messages
projected onto a screen and signalled by a clearly audible bell. Each message consisted of an
alpha-numeric code (such as A453 or B877) which could be quickly interpreted by reference
to a code-sheet (private to each trader) linking the observed code to a very simple probability
distribution of values. The prefixes A and B always signified good and bad news respectively,
while the numeric suffix identified a particular probability distribution on the code-sheet.
Traders were therefore immediately able to judge the quality of the information and could
quickly adjust their orders in general. The only exception was for ‘current’ offers (defined as
the highest bid and the lowest ask) which could not be withdrawn. For example, the coded
message A741 indicated that the stock price should rise (from a pre-existing value of about
$3.70). The possible share values associated with this message are shown in Table 2, as $3.80,
$3.95 or $4.10, with probability .5, .25 and .25 respectively.
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Table 2. Example of Code and Corresponding Information
Coded Message Information (Probability Distribution)
25% 50% 25%
A741 3.80 3.95 4.10
This procedure allowed asymmetric information to be introduced in controlled and discreet
fashion and had two particular advantages. First, it was unnecessary for traders to perform
complicated calculations in order to arrive at possible stock values, thereby avoiding
unnecessary transaction costs. Second, it was possible to introduce different private
information to different traders by altering the contents of the code-sheet reference tables
provided to particular individuals. Values revealed to insiders were always higher for good
news and lower for bad news than those revealed to other traders and insiders were always
aware that the true value of the share would be drawn from their private information.
New information was delivered to the market at random time intervals, varying
between 1 and 15 minutes. The average number of messages per session was 12, but with
some variation between sessions. The messages did not appreciably interrupt the continuous
flow of trading.
Traders were able to choose portfolio management strategies that depended on both
coded information and the behaviour of other traders (they could observe the complete order
book on the computer screen at all times during each session, and could therefore see all
prices and quantities proposed for trading). They were able to propose their own orders (ask
or bid) and accept the orders of others either wholly or in part. Orders to sell (ask) could be
implemented either by proposing a price lower than the current lowest asking price or by
accepting another trader’s bid. Similarly, orders to buy could be implemented either by
increasing the current highest bid or by accepting the current ask. Thus, the lowest asking
price and the highest bid price constituted the current bid-ask spread of the market while
market depth was shown by the quantities of shares displayed in the complete order book.
Traders could occupy more than one bid or ask position simultaneously and could either raise
their bid or lower their asking price. They were also able to see their position in the order
book by an asterisk, visible only to themselves, and to keep track of the composition and
value their own portfolios.
To examine price efficiency and imitative behaviour we carried out tests for co-
integration between observed prices and expected prices (with either public or insider
information). The means of the probability distributions for the information series were taken
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from a computer-generated random walk so that the current information message estimated
the rational expected price (conditional on either insider or non-insider information, as
appropriate).
Experimental Subjects
12 student volunteers (MSc students9 of Banking, Economics and Finance) participated in the
experiment as traders in the simulated market. An initial training session of 90 minutes was
given prior to the experimental sessions to ensure that each participant was thoroughly
familiar with the computerised quotation system, the mechanisms of trading and the
dissemination of information.
Each subject was paid a fixed participation fee of £10, plus a variable amount that
depended on the results of their simulated trading over the five experimental sessions. While
the amounts earned were relatively small, all of the subjects became enthusiastically caught
up in the competitive market spirit of the experiment. Profits and losses from each session
were accumulated over the entire experiment, but endowments were re-established at the
beginning of each session. In this way, rewards were made linked to total experimental
performance. In order to even out the opportunities for profit across all participants (to
prevent any post-experiment acrimony) each participant was designated as an insider on one
occasion during the experiment.
The endowment given to each trader at the beginning of each session consisted of an
amount of shares (a risky asset) and cash (which earned a risk-free rate of return). The size of
the endowment was varied only in session 4. At the end of each session the values of
portfolios were calculated by using the end-of session share price and a 10% rate of return on
cash. The end-of-session share price was drawn at random from the probability distribution of
possible insider share values defined by the last information message of the session – that is,
the probability distribution seen by insiders always included the correct share value and
insiders were aware of this. Since traders could not predict the exact time at which a session
would terminate, any information message had the possibility of being the last.
                                                 
9 Such ‘student-traders’ have been widely used in experimental economics and seem likely to
to generate qualitative results similar to those provided by professional traders (Dej g et al.,
1988) although see also footnote 2 above.
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3. Experimental Results
Session 1: Base-line (Homogeneous Endowments and Information)
In this session all traders received the same information and endowments. Nothing about the
conduct of this (or any other) session gave any indication about the experimental
manipulations of subsequent sessions. The session was used to establish a h mogeneous
expectations base-line against which to compare other results. The session was also made
long enough to ensure that subjects were fully trained, thereby adding to the extensive prior
instruction and practice. Results are presented graphically in Figure 1, where it is evident that
new information is quite quickly reflected in market prices.
Figure 1. Evolution of Prices in Session 1
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(in seconds)
Efficiency requires information to be immediately incorporated into observed prices. If
both the observed and expected prices are non-stationary I(1) pr cesses, this implies that the
two series should have a stationary I(0) co-integrating relationship. To test for this we
assigned an expected price and an observed price to each second of the session. There is a
problem with this procedure – although the information series was itself generated as a
random walk, the implied expected prices necessarily remained constant for relatively long
intervals (see Figure 1). This appears to violate the assumption that the expected price series
is stochastic, but without a clearly superior alternative we report the co-integration results.
We tested for unit roots in the price series using sequential augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests (ADF) in the manner of Jobert (1992). The results are displayed in Table 3.
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Table 3: Results of Sequential ADF tests on Session 1 Price Series
Session 1 Expected Prices Observed Prices
Value of ADF -2.334173 -2.8475
Rejection Threshold 10%:  -2.8631 5%:  -2.8631
Jobert Diagnosis of Process I(1) I(1)
Evidently the observed and expected prices both follow a non-stationary I(1) process.
Efficiency requires the observed prices to follow the expected prices very closely
(information is immediately incorporated into observed prices) implying that the observed and
expected price series should have a stationary I(0) co-integrating relationship. The results of a
Johansen testing procedure are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Results of Johansen Tests on Session 1 Observed and Expected Price Series
Likelihood
Ratio
Critical Value
5%
Critical Value
1%
Decision on
Hypothesis
1
0H : 0=r 18.2928 12.53 16.31 Rejected*
2
0H : 1£r 0.02128 3.84 6.51 Accepted
The order of co-integration is denoted by r. 10H : the series are not co-integrated. 
2
0H : there exists at most one
co-integrating relationship.* Hypothesis rejected at 1% level. Critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Hypothesis 10H  is rejected at the 1% level while hypothesis 
2
0H  cannot be rejected. It is
therefore likely that observed and expected prices are co-integrated and that the market can be
regarded as reasonably efficient. Normalising on tOP  ave the estimate tt EPOP 00282.1-
(standard error 0.00832).
Despite the evidence of co-integration, it appears from Figure 1 that there tends to be
an under-reaction to new information, suggesting that perfect efficiency may not have been
entirely achieved. To examine this further we define the deviation of observed (tOP1 ) from
expected ( tEP1 ) prices as the ‘spread’ (tS1 ):
(1) ttt EPOPS 111 -= .
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The subscript denotes session 1, while the superscript denotes elapsed time during the
experimental session. The evolution of tS1  is shown in Figure 2, with descriptive statistics
given in Table 5. A non-zero value of tS1  evidently measures a component of price that is not
explained by current information in a risk-neutral market. While this may reflect a degree of
informational inefficiency it could also be due to learning effects or risk-aversion. Since tS1
does not differ significantly from zero we conclude that the results from session 1 cannot be
used to reject a hypothesis of market efficiency, and can therefore be used as a base-line
against which to compare the results of other sessions.
Figure 2. Spread tS1  for Session 1
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Table 5. Statistics of Spread tS1
Statistic Value
Mean 0.01333
Median 0.20
Maxim. 0.56
Min. -1.16
Std. Dev. 0.147242
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Session 2. Unannounced Presence of Insiders, Homogeneous Endowments
In Session 2 an attempt was made to influence market prices by introducing asymmetric
information and insider trading, with initial endowments being equal for all traders. Insiders
received privileged information about true market values and their presence in the market was
not disclosed to other traders. Since the experimental subjects were naïve with regard to
asymmetric information and insider trading we did not anticipate any appreciable change in
price formation (hypothesis 2).
Privileged information was introduced by giving insider traders a different code-sheet.
Insiders were told both of their privileged position as insiders and that their i form ion was
true (a random drawing from the insider code-sheet was used to determine end-of-session
share prices). Insiders were therefore in a position to benefit from each new piece of
information by exploiting the erroneous share valuations of uninformed traders.
Figure 3 shows the behaviour of observed prices in session 2, tOP2 . These are
compared to i) the rationally expected prices for uninformed traders, tEP2 , and ii) the
rationally expected prices conditional on insider information,tIP2 .
Figure 3. Evolution of Prices in Session 2
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Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 1, it appears that the presence of insiders did not much affect
the evolution of market prices – that is, efficiency with respect to insider information was not
achieved10.
                                                 
10 The two insiders were also able to exploit their private information for gain, making larger
profits than the other raders in this session.
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The observed price series actually contains information that might have been detected by
skilled uninformed traders. We define the ‘spreads’ for uninformed and informed traders by
tSN2  and 
tSI2  respectively:
(3) ttt EPOPSN 222 -=
(4) ttt IPOPSI 222 -= .
As indicated in Table 6 below, tSN2  is significantly larger than 
tS1  (the base-line session),
indicating a significantly greater deviation of observed prices from their predicted path when
insiders are present. The very large discrepancy between tSN2  and 
tSI2  reflects the non-
transmission of insider information.
Table 6. Comparison of Mean values for tSN2  and 
tSI2  with 
tS1
Mean Std dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN2 -0.0517 0.1687 1783 13.317* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN2  have identical means
tSI2 0.2885 0.6411 1783 -17.821* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI2  have identical means
* Hypothesis rejected at the 1% significance level.
In summary, it appears that the unannounced introduction of traders with privileged
information to a previously efficient market led to a small increase in price volatility whose
significance was apparently not understood by uninformed traders.
Session 3. Insiders known to Exist, Homogeneous Endowments
In session 3 the existence of anonymous insiders was made known to all participants. All
traders were made to understand that the insiders possessed privileged information that they
could use to trade advantageously. This manipulation was intended to the informational
transparency of the market simply by reducing the naivete of the participants. Under
hypothesis 3, we anticipated a general increase in the efficiency of observed prices.
The evolution of prices in session 3 is depicted in Figure 4. An interesting feature of
this Figure 4 is the tendency for observed prices to move towards the expected price for
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insiders following bad news but to move towards the expected price for uninformed traders
following good news. Hypothesis 3 appears to be only partly confirmed.
Figure 4. Evolution of Prices in Session 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Expected Prices
Uninformed Traders
Expected Prices
Insiders
Observed
Prices
Elapsed Time
(in seconds)
Session 3 also produced very large spreads (tSN3 nd
tSI3 ) compared to the base-line session,
as shown in Table 7 below. The mean value of tSN3  is 17 times greater than that of the base-
line spread, tS1 , (and 4½ times as large as the corresponding spread for session 2, 
tSN2) with a
substantially larger standard deviation.
Table 7. Comparison of Mean values for tSN3 and 
tSI3 with 
tS1 , Session 3
Mean Std Dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN3 0.23 0.2577 1792 -32,319* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN3 have identical means
tSI3 0.3096 0.5802 1792 -21,176* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI3 have identical means
0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
The sensitisation of traders to the existence of insiders appeared to induce two types of
behaviour. First, traders apparently began to imitate the behaviour of others, using both price
and quantity information from the on-screen order book. Such behaviour is consistent with the
findings of other researchers (Bloomfield and Libby 1996, Cao et al., 1998). Second,
reactions to ‘bad news’ were amplified, while reactions to ‘good news’ were damped. This
counter-intuitive result seems to reflect risk-averse portfolio behaviour (avoidance of loss has
greater priority than exploitation of uncertain gain – selling equities in a falling market both
restricts further equity losses and increases the share of the riskless ass t in the portfolio). It is
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also possible that the insiders may have felt liquidity constrained to the extent that the insider
price signals were weaker in a rising market – that is, they may have better able to sell shares
on receipt of bad news than to buy shares on receipt of good news.
There are two sub-periods in session 3 which provide evidence of imitative behaviour:
Interval 35-180 and Interval 700-1500 (intervals measured in seconds of elapsed time).
During both of these intervals insider information indicated a greater potential decline in asset
values than did the information of non-insiders. The price paths for these two intervals are
shown in Figures 5 and 6 while the corresponding spreads are given in Tables 8 and 9. It is
evident that the spread for non-insiders, tSN3 , is substantially greater than the spread for the
baseline session, tS1 .
Figure 5. Evolution of Prices during Interval 38-180, Session 3
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Figure 6. Evolution of Prices during the Interval 700-1500, Session 3
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
Observed
Prices
Expected Prices
Insiders
Expected Prices
Uninformed Traders
Elapsed Time
(in seconds)
Table 8. Comparison of tSN3,
tSI3 and 
tS1 , Session 3, Interval 38-180
Mean Std Dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN3 0.1467 0.3447 143 -4.6054* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN3 have identical means
tSI3 -0.1575 0.4117 143 4.9448* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI3 have identical means
0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
Table 9. Comparison of tSN3,
tSI3 and 
tS1 , Session 3, Interval 700-1500
Mean Std Dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN3 0.3648 0.2510 801 -37.761* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN3 have identical means
tSI3 -0.040 0.5823 801 2.6005* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI3 have identical means
0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
It is possible that in Interval 700-1500 uninformed traders had less confidence in information
provided by the order book than in Interval 35-180 – this could have been caused by the
subsequent failure of insider orders to provoke a sustained price increase during Inte v l 180-
700. That is, non-insiders may have come to distrust the quality of information conveyed by
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abnormal orders, perhaps because the volume of abnormal orders was too small. As already
noted, an expectation that imitative behaviour would increase with the market power of
insiders was the driving rationale behind the manipulation in session 4.
In summary, a degree of imitative behaviour emerged when uninformed traders used
information available through the Order Book, although this was restricted to down-market
conditions (periods of bad news). A comparison between sessions 2 and 3 shows that this
imitative behaviour only occurred after the experimental subjects were sensitised to the
presence of insiders – as naïve traders they ignored the available signals.
Session 4. Insiders known to Exist, Insiders with Market Power.
Session 4 was identical to session 3 except that the endowments of insiders were increased by
300% relative to those of uninformed traders. The aim was to investigate further the
conditions under which imitative behaviour might occur – in this case by making it possible
for insider trades to be more clearly signalled. Under hypothesis 4 we anticipated a general
increase in the efficiency of market prices, over and above any efficiency gains obtained
through the manipulation in session 3.
Figure 7 shows a marked tendency for the observed price to approach the expected
price for insiders following bad news but to approach the expected price for uninformed
traders following good news. The continued failure of the market to transmit insider
information in up-market conditions was even more marked in session 4 than in session 3 and
was unexpected.
Figure 7. Evolution of Prices for Session 4
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Spread tSN4  is once again large compared to the base-line spread 
tS1 , a  shown in Table 10 –
that is, observed prices diverge from the expected prices of uninformed traders by
substantially more than in the base-line session.
Table 10. Comparison of Mean Values for tSN4  and 
tSI4  with 
tS1 , Session 4
Mean Std Dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN4 0.2616 0.2706 1911 13.140* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN4  have identical means
tSI4 0.367 0.4523 1911 18.279* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI4  have identical means
* 0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
tSN4  is actually closer to 
tSI4  than it is to 
tS1 . This is largely driven price formation during
two sub-periods – Interval 1-600 and Interval 1000-1500. The spreads for these intervals are
shown in Tables 11 and 12 while the evolution of prices is shown in Figures 8 and 9
respectively.
Table 11: Comparison of tSN4  and 
tSI4  with 
tS1 , Interval 1-600, Session 4
Mean Std Dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN4 0.3168 0.3019 595 -12.329* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN4  have identical means
tSI4 0.1531 0.3908 595 -0.4413 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI4  have identical means
* 0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
Table 12: Comparison of tSN4  and 
tSI4  with 
tS1 , Interval 1000-1500, Session 4
Mean Std Dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN4 0.4593 0.2339 501 -41.2151* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN4  have identical means
tSI4 0.0649 0.4642 501 -2.4640* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI4  have identical means
* 0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
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Figure 8. Evolution of Prices during Interval 1-600, Session 4
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Figure 9. Evolution of Prices during interval 1000-1500, Session 4
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Interval 1-600 shows the more marked effect. During this interval, covering 10 minutes of
trading, observed prices were driven entirely by the information available only to 2 insiders
(out of 12 traders). We conclude that imitative behaviour was present for Interval 1-600.
Such behaviour is also evident in I erval 1000-1500, although it is slightly less
marked. Uninformed traders were evidently less sure of detecting insider information during
this interval than they were during interval 1-600. This is suggested by the sudden but
temporary return of observed prices to the expected path for uninformed traders at times 1020
and 1220.
In summary, the results of both sessions 3 and 4 suggest that the revealed presence of
insider information led to imitative behaviour on the part of uninformed agents. It is also
apparent that this behaviour was asymmetric, in the sense that insider ‘bad news’ was
transmitted to the market while insider ‘good news’ was not. Somewhat surprisingly, the
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relative increase in the market power of insiders from session 3 to session 4 appeared to
exacerbate this asymmetry. Such behaviour is consistent with risk-aversion, although we have
no other evidence to support this explanation.
Session 5. Free Communication, Identical Endowments and Insiders known to exist.
The parameters for this session were identical to those of session 3, except that trad rs were
allowed to communicate freely and to spread rumours. The only restriction was that no trader
was allowed to show any written evidence to prove that he/she was or was not an insider
(traders could not show their code-sheets.) The intention was to create a climate in which
speculative bubbles and imitative behaviour would be stimulated. Under hypothesis 5 we
anticipated a decrease in informational efficiency and an increase in price volatility.
The results provide evidence in support of the beneficial effect of market transparency
on price efficiency. As Figure 10 shows, observed prices behaved very much in accordance
with those of the base-line session (symmetric information and homogeneous endowments).
Figure 10. Evolution of the prices for Session 5
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Communication between traders was very active during this session, creating considerable
informational noise that apparently prevented the signalling of insider information. It is also
noticeable that speculative bubbles and crashes were not an marked feature of this session
although there were three short intervals during which prices were volatile and peaked at
values in excess of the highest rational expectation. This did not happen at any point during
Sessions 2, 3 and 4 and these peaks are suggestive of the kind of speculative pricing that
might be expected under conditions of uncertainty and rumour. No strong evidence of
imitative behaviour can be seen, however.
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The spread for uninformed traders in session 5, tSN5 , was very close to that of the
base-line session, tS1 whereas 
tSI5  was significantly different. That is, prices were no more
volatile than in the base-line session.
Table 19. Comparison of tSN5  and 
tSI5  with 
tS1 , Session 5
Mean Std dev. N Z Hypothesis
tS1 0.01333 0.1472 2750
tSN5 0.1575 0.4736 4178 -1.2413 0H :
tS1  and 
tSN4  have identical means
tSI5 -0.0079 0.888 4178 10.14779* 0H :
tS1  and 
tSI4  have identical means
* 0H  rejected at 1% significance level.
We were unable to record the verbal communications between traders and hence are unable to
ascertain that a climate of rumour actually emerged. To this extent we were unable to directly
test the hypothesis that the incidence of speculative bubbles and crashes increases in such a
climate. It was clear from the communication we observed, however, that a considerable
amount of informational ‘noise’ was created and it seems very likely that this masked the
order-book operations of the insiders. This raises questions about how to spread rumours
effectively and in a controlled fashion in a simulated trading experiment. Further work on the
experimental design, incorporating tighter experimental controls, will be needed before
conclusions can be drawn about the effect of rumours in experimental markets.
4. Conclusion
Imitative behaviour may be responsible for a significant proportion of the volatility of prices
observable in real-world asset markets. This experimental study was designed to explore the
conditions that provoke such imitative behaviour. The experiment used a double-auction
electronic simulated stock market with twelve participants and asymmetric information.
When the asymmetric information was not revealed it had little effect on observed
prices other than a slight increase in volatility – uninformed traders apparently used public
information to determine their ask and bid orders. Insiders were able to exploit their positions
to earn greater than average profits by trading discreetly. In contrast, imitative behaviour by
uninformed traders emerged in as soon as the existence of insiders was revealed. We suspect
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that uninformed agents used quantity information from the observable electronic order book
to guide their trading behaviour – an abnormal bid or ask price is more likely to persist in the
market if accompanied by high volume. This is a subject for further research.
The experiment was also intended to investigate the possibility that speculative
bubbles in auction markets are created by imitative behaviour. Surprisingly, the imitative
behaviour that we observed was linked to ‘bad news’ (an announced fall in the fundamental
value of shares) but not to ‘good news’, so that no speculative bubbles were actually
simulated in sessions 3 and 4. This result may be partly explained by risk-averse trading
strategies, although there may have been other unintended experimental constraints of which
we are as yet unaware.
Finally, we unable to generate strongly abnormal price movements by encouraging
communication between traders and the spread of rumours, although there was weak evidence
of speculative pricing in Session 5 that was not observable in sessions 2, 3 and 4. It appeared
that the trading of insiders was generally obscured by uninformed trading. In any event,
insiders had no incentive to reveal themselves to the market by direct communication and
they were apparently not revealed through the electronic order book. Uninformed traders may
have preferred to use their own information and accept trading profits that were somewhat
limited. In effect, the cost of scouring the order book for revealed insider information in the
search for hypothetical profits may simply have been too great – traders may have preferred
less costly information of lower quality.
Further experiments are necessary if these issues are to be explored further. Of
particular interest is further investigation of the role of rumour and of the processes that
generate risk-averse behaviour. This may necessitate tighter experimental control (possibly
with ‘stooge’ participants) to make the rumours better defined and implanted.
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Appendix 1. The Electronic Trading Screen and the Summary Instruction Sheet .
The Electronic Trading Screen (Dummy Information)
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SIMPLE GUIDE TO THE PROGRAMME
ATTENTION: This is an interactive programme! When you hit a key the programme will
issue simple instructions for you to follow. On the computer screen you will find a quotation
panel, illustrated below:
Queues
Price Qty
4.25 6
4.00 2
3.80 4
3.75 5
A A
PROPOSE A SALE
To ASK:
Type <A> followed by:
a price
<space>
a quantity
<enter>
In this case you have proposed
to sell 2 shares at a price of
$4.00
PROPOSE A PURCHASE
To BID:
Type B followed by
 a price
<space>
 a quantity
<enter>
In this case you propose to buy 4
shares at a price of $3.80
TO SELL
Type S followed by
 a quantity
<enter>
In this case you agree to the
price of the highest bidder:
you will sell up to 4 shares at
a price of $3.80.
TO PURCHASE
Type <P> followed by:
a quantity
<Enter>
In this case you agree to the lowest
price being asked: you will buy up
to two shares at a price of $4.00.
You may cancel either a bid or an ask, but you cannot cancel
a purchase or a sale.
